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criticism will appear retrospectively to have been as misguided (to paraphrase Regis Debray) as Communist attacks on progressive French universities on the eve of the Nazi invasion. 4 Still, it should be possible to admit the partial truth of observations like Dirlik's, it seems to me, without also endorsing the crushing conclusions that Dirlik draws from them about the illegitimacy and misguidedness of postcolonial studies generally-conclusions which offer comfort and consolation to the field's political opponents. Yes, the existence of (post)colonial discourse does express "newfound power" as well as agonies of identity on the part of its practitioners. And so? Would this not be the case for any successful intellectual movement, any movement that wins provisional popular and/or institutional support for its terms and agendas, whatever the criteria of progressiveness it is judged by? Or have we actually come to believe that any success in winning support is in itself a fatal sign of co-optation, or evidence that the movement was never progressive to begin with? If not, then the failure to answer the many critiques like this, indeed the seemingly masochistic tendency to repeat and delight in them, would seem to indicate an incoherence at the point where class and (inter)nationalism intersect that is rather mysterious. And this incoherence is also dangerous. For the lack of a vocabulary that would offer (post)colonial critics some other articulation between nationalism and class also means the inability to represent themselves and what they do in public. What (post)colonial studies needs, it seems to me, is not a political purge or purification (although, like everyone else, I have my own points of disagreement with various routine assumptions), but a different and impious view of its own authority (such as it is), some narrative of how it arrived at that authority, and some explanation of what that authority has to do with the transnational circle or sphere to which it holds itself newly accountable. This is more than I am presently prepared to do myself. But it is with this task in mind that I would like to make some remarks about the recent work of Edward Said and in particular about the distinctive version of internationalism that clusters around his favored phrases "secular criticism" and the "secular intellectual."5 Said is of course one of the few academic figures in the U.S. who have managed to give public voice both to serious criticism of American foreign policy and, with more difficulty, to solidarities that are not centered on or limited to the unquestioned priority of the American national interest.6 Most remarkably, he has managed to defend the interests of the Palestinian national movement while maintaining an extremely skeptical view of nationalism as such. Indeed, perhaps the most crucial meaning of secular, in his usage, is as an opposing term not to religion but to nationalism. In the interview with Jennifer Wicke and Michael Sprinker published in Sprinker's Edward 1W Said: A Critical Reader, Said sets the "ideal of secular interpretation and secular work" against "submerged feelings of identity, of tribal solidarity," of community that is "geographically and homogeneously defined."7 "The dense fabric of secular life," Said says, is what "can't be herded under the rubric of national identity or can't be made entirely to respond to this phony idea of a paranoid frontier separating 'us' from 'them'-which is a repetition of the old sort of orientalist model." "The politics of secular interpretation proposes a way ... of avoiding the pitfalls of nationalism."8 Now the word secular has usually served as a figure for the authority of a putatively universal reason, or (narratively speaking) as the ideal endpoint of progress in the intellectual domain. In appropriating the word as a sort of insignia, then, Said clearly runs the risk of (in Tim Brennan's words) "assuming the nineteenth century mantle of progress and enlightenment."9 Naturally enough, this usage has not gone uncontested among critics of Eurocentrism. R. Radhakrishnan, for example, objects in "Postcoloniality and the Boundaries of Identity" to how "'the secular' as a western norm is made to operate naturally and therefore namelessly."10 "What we have to realize," Peter van der Veer writes in Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament, "is that the very distinction between religious and secular is a product of the Enlightenment that was used in orientalism to draw a sharp opposition between irrational, religious behavior of the Oriental and rational secularism, which enabled the westerner to rule the Oriental."1' Meanwhile, the Subaltern Studies group has stressed the further connection between secularism and indigenous elites. Extending the argument from Western Orientalists to the secularism of Indian nationalist elites, Ranajit Guha argues, for instance, that the latter, "unable to grasp religiosity as the central modality of peasant consciousness in colonial India," necessarily fail "to conceptualize insurgent mentality except in terms of an unadulterated secularism."12 Or, as Dipesh Chakrabarty puts it, secular nationalism in India has meant "an act of appropriation by elite (and elitist) Indians, on behalf of their project of building an Indian state, of diverse historical struggles of the subaltern classes."'3 The case against elites and the case against secularism seem to be the same case.14 Having seen a certain ressentiment directed at his professional renown and his privileged position in an elite metropolitan university, Said shows some bravery in standing together with so authoritative a term as secularism. And, at the same time, his descriptions of the intellectual also try to evade this authority. "cosmopolitanism and intellectual tourism," to any internationalism that would express a "superior detachment ... a general all-encompassing love for all of humanity."15 In other words, the word secular seems to aim at a version of internationalism that would do without the direct authoritative backing either of a putatively universal class, as in the Marxist version, or of disinterested rationality. Is it, then, a sort of postmodern secularism that attempts to do without any authority? '6 Here another implication of secular is pertinent: the suggestion that the so-called clerisy must learn to work without the quasi-theological guarantees and quasi-theological self-conceptions that have served it in the past. At the end of his final Reith lecture in the summer of 1993, now published in Raritan, Said declared that "the true intellectual is a secular being. However much intellectuals pretend that their representations are of higher things or ultimate values, morality begins with their activity in this secular world of ours-where it takes place, whose interests it serves."17 Rather than some sort of exemplary otherworldliness, being a secular intellectual seems here to mean resigning oneself to an inevitable profane untidiness, an impurity, a political incorrectness. Yet it also seems to draw energy and authority from that refusal of virtue. And this is perhaps because, implicitly, it entails biting the not entirely bitter bullet of institutional privilege. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, secularism is "the doctrine that morality should be based solely in regard to the well-being of mankind in the present life to the exclusion of all considerations drawn from belief in God or in a future state." If intellectuals should be "worldly" or even "profane," at least partially subdued to the untidiness of an unjust and hierarchical world, then perhaps they must do some strategic acquiescing in institutional or professional hierarchies.
The last lines of the final Reith lecture, "Gods That Always Fail," go as follows: "As an intellectual you are the one who can choose between actively representing the truth to the best of your ability, or passively allowing a patron or an authority to direct you. For the secular intellectual, those gods always fail." Add to this the refusal of all orthodoxy and dogma, of any "kind of absolute certainty" or any "total, seamless view of reality," and you get a secular intellectual who submits to no authority, even that of his or her own beliefs or findings.l8 Given this somewhat deconstructive thrust of the term secular-not just antinationalist but against any grounding of intellectual mission and activity-one would imagine that Said would be quite harsh with Julien Benda's Trahison des clercs, a text that grounds its attractive antinationalism upon a shamelessly sacred view of the intellectual. Surprisingly, he is not.19 On the key issue of the clerics' betrayal, he comes down on Benda's side. Which is to say that he implicitly endorses, here and throughout the Reith lectures, the sense of high vocation without which there could be no betrayal. This stubborn fidelity to an ideal of vocation is clearly one reason why his work is so moving to so many people. But it is all the more reason to ask on what grounds, on what secular authority this sense of mission might be based. The question is absolutely crucial, for it seems to promise a different difference between intellectuals and nonintellectuals, an articulation between the two that does not demand that the first simply dissolve into the second, and at the same time an authority that is specifically and uncompromisingly internationalist.
The secular ideal of the intellectual who "speaks truth to power," which Said celebrates in Benda and elsewhere, pays no explicit attention to the decisive question-the same question in another form-of why power would listen, what might make it listen, what makes anyone listen. That is, it has nothing explicit to say about the source of counterauthority that intellectuals must be assumed to counterpose to "power." This absence of critical or countervailing authority is all the more evident given that the term secular functions elsewhere in Said so as to frustrate the usual answers to the authority question: the dogmatic authority of disinterested truth and the authority of an ethnically purified local or national community, as we have already seen, and also the borrowed sanctity of the professional community. In the introduction to The World, the Text, and the Critic, entitled "Secular Criticism," Said mobilizes the term secular in an attack on what he calls, again from the theological lexicon, the "cult of professional expertise," with its sense of "vocation" and its "quasi-religious quietism." 20 What sorts of authority might there be, then? One hint comes from Said's most sympathetic words about Julien Benda, which suggest a sort of economy of authority. Intellectuals, Said says, "have to be in a state of almost permanent opposition to the status quo." And this is why "Benda's intellectuals are perforce a small, highly visible group." Here intellectual authority would seem to come from the presumed rarity or scarcity of those willing to confront nonintellectual authority. It would come, that is, from a "rarefaction" of intellectuals-I borrow the term from Said's influential appreciation of Foucault-that formally resembles the dread concept of elitism, but that offers the restrictiveness of the group an ethicopolitical legitimacy (the unusual courage needed for opposition to the status quo) rather than a meritocratic one. Or perhaps it would be fairer to say that rather than the profession deciding who is a competent scholar, it is power that decides who is a real intellectual, whose dissent is painful or threatening enough to be worthy of public expressions of dislike. The authority of the intellectual is a faithful inversion of the authority of power itself, and is thus dependent upon it. Here the amoral connotations of secularism are not far beneath the surface. Practically speaking, an ethical scarcity defined by opposition will be indistinguishable from a social scarcity that is a potential source of profit and prestige. An undesired visibility, resulting from the political hostility of the powers that be, can and perhaps must be exchanged for celebrity, the prized, often apolitical currency of honors and economic rewards.
This In this model, no authority is ascribed to the place from which the mobile "oblate" sets out; all authority is imagined to flow from the institutional destination. There is no possibility that the protagonist's initial poverty might serve in any way the (legitimating) purposes of the institution, nor-more important-that the protagonist's rise from that origin might help change that destination in any way, or change the composition of the cultural capital subsequently transmitted to others.
Said's "voyage in" narrative redistributes the emphasis radically. While it does not underestimate the continuing authority of metropolitan institutions, neither does it treat the composition of cultural capital as fixed once and for all or assume that to accept it is necessarily to offer the donor unconditional loyalty in return. National origin matters; transfers from the periphery to the center do not leave the center as it was. The transnational story of upward mobility is not just a claiming of authority but a redefinition of authority, and a redefinition that can have many beneficiaries, for it means a recomposition as well as a redistribution of cultural capital. In short, progress is possible.
Ironically, critiques of postcolonial studies which declare their fidelity to Marxist orthodoxy also turn out to be those which, unlike Marx's, seem to preclude the untidily dialectical existence of progress. Arif Dirlik, for example, agrees that success stories like this one must offer some answer to the crucial question of where the newfound authority comes from: "Merely pointing to the ascendant role that intellectuals of Third World origin have played in propagating postcolonial as a critical orientation within First World academia begs the question as to why they and their intellectual concerns and orientations have been accorded the respectability that they have." In Dirlik's view, the metropolitan success of Third World intellectuals that has given the term postcolonial its currency has been "dependent on the conceptual needs of the social, political, and cultural problems thrown up by [a] new world situation," that is, by changes in world capitalism. "In their very globalism, the cultural requirements of transnational corporations can no longer afford the cultural parochialism of an earlier day"; they have "a need to internationalize academic institutions (which often takes the form not of promoting scholarship in a conventional sense but of 'importing' and 'exporting' students and faculty)."28
The messiness of the word secular seems a necessary antidote to this invocation of world capitalism, an invocation which might be described either as overtidy or as theological. For Dirlik, global capitalism is assumed to be not only "organized" (a matter of dispute among Marxist economists) but ubiquitous and omnipotent; whatever happens expresses its will, a will that is undialectically unified and, in terms of its effects on Third World peoples, invariably malignant. There is no room here for a cunning of reason that, to cite Marx's famous discussion of the British in India, could bring forth a certain political progress even from the worst horrors of colonialism. It is hard to see how, within this worldview, any progress is conceivable that would not, upon its emergence, immediately demand to be reinterpreted as the result of capitalism's disguised but malevolent intentions.
The common assumption for all of us who begin, in the study of colonial and postcolonial culture, with the intolerable facts of global suffering and injustice ought surely to be, on the contrary, that progress is an absolute necessity. Of course, as Anne McClintock points out, the word itself is entangled with a history of racism and Eurocentric self-congratulation, and so too is postcolonial.29 Of course, any historical instance of progress will obligatorily be compromised in any number of ways, as the rise of (post)colonial studies is compromised by its metropolitan and class location. But this does not mean it is so contaminated as to be unsayable; we are not so rich in instances that we can afford to throw any out in the name of an ideal purity. For progress must be believed to be possible before it can be fought for, and narratives of progress, including narratives of upward mobility, do just this work. Thus such narratives cannot be disposed of by the simple thought that for most of the world's people, there has been no upward mobility. The incongruities between narratives of upward mobility and the static or declining state of the world cannot be corrected by some voluntary gesture of self-discipline whereby narrative would henceforth allow no image of fulfilled desire not statistically guaranteed by actual improvement on the part of X thousands or millions of people. For narratives, including metanarratives, are obliged to make use of desire, and there is no politics without them. As Alan Sinfield has noted, the rise of British "left culturism," including the careers of Raymond Williams, E. P. Thompson, and Richard Hoggart, was after all by no means an easy or inevitable fact of postwar cultural life; and their legitimation was secured in part by narratives of "upward mobility through education," which was "a story that society, or parts of it, wanted to tell itself, not a record of experience."30 Anyone who sees (post)colonial studies as a ruse of world capitalism should be prepared to say that the cultural scene would have been better off without these figures, or that the current scene would be better off without the equally contingent presence of figures like Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Stuart Hall.
On Said's 'Voyage In"
In describing what he calls "the global cultural economy," Arjun Appadurai has distinguished between "finanscapes," or flows of capital, and "ideoscapes," or flows of ideologies and images. His point is that there is a "disjuncture" between these flows; no one of them (he provisionally distinguishes five levels) is a mere effect of any other.31 No account of global capitalism can afford to forget this disjuncture, which makes a space for redistributions of cultural capital that are neither simply metaphorical nor simply epiphenomena of the real thing. I am trying to suggest, a bit obliquely, that the new internationalism or multiculturalism of the academic left can be seen as one effect of a recomposition of cultural capital-an effect that Said's "voyage in" narrative risks the charge of elitism in order to authorize and legitimate. The power of anti-elitism, whether in Richard Rorty's denunciation of rootless cosmopolitans or elsewhere, depends, of course, not on refusing narratives of upward mobility but only on controlling them. Said's "voyage in" can, I think, be seen as a courageous and well-timed effort to take back these narratives, to use them in a different sharing out of intellectual authority. It is more than incidental that, in so doing, it also offers an implicit answer to the enigma of where the postcolonial critic's secular authority comes from. The authority of internationalism, according to this narrative, comes from the national itself, or even from nationalism-though not everyone's nationalism, and not a nationalism that can itself be unchanged by taking part in the operation.
In the vocabulary of Abdul JanMohamed, we could perhaps say that the precarious but necessary authority that Said gives to secular internationalism is founded on an ambiguous border crossing: neither simply an exile (which privileges the place of origin) nor simply an immigration (which privileges the destination), but both an exile and an immigration at once.32 It is tempting to stress the Americanness of the optimistic narrative that Said thus counterposes to the French "oblation," and even to stress the legitimate pride one might feel in belonging, in this somewhat modified version of John F Kennedy's words, to "a nation of immigrants."33 With all due gratitude, however, for the support that the U.S. thus offers to the multicultural project of changing the center, I would prefer to express my affiliation internationally, with the many otherwise situated groups and individuals, in the U.S. and elsewhere, who take this secular, progressive project as their own. 
